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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS
AooP'l'IoN.-RIGHT -ro INHERIT IIROM: Fos'ttR PAI!tN'l'S NOT LosT BY RsADOP'l'ION ·BY NATURAi. FATHJ>R.-In an adopted child's action against the
natural children of foster parents and their assigns for the partition of real
estate, where it appeared that the child had been re-adopted by the natural
father, and where it appeared that she had stood by while the natural children sold the property to the co-defendants, it was held that the right to
inherit from the foster parents was not lost by the readoption by the natural
father and that she was ncit estopped to assert her rights. Holmes v. Curl,
et al, (Iowa, 1920) 178 N. W. 4o6.
At common law adoption was unknown. Hence the legal status of an
adopted child depends entirely on the statute. Albring v. Ward, 137 Mich.
352; Pi>cK, Doou;STIC Rsr.ATIONS, Sec. 1o6. The statutes provide in most
states that the adopted child may inherit from the adopting parents. M orrison v. Sessions, 70 Mich. 297; STIMSON, AY£RICAN STATun LAW, § 6647 A.
His right to inherit from his natural kindred, however, is not thereby de. stroyed. In re Darling's Estate, I73 Cal. 221; IS MICH. L. R£v. I6I. The Iowa
cOd~ (I897), Chapter 7, title 16, cQntains the provision that the relations between the adopted child and foster parents "shall be the same that exist by
law lietween parent and child by lawful birth." This being the case, the rights
given to the child under the statute could not be destroyed at the pleasure of
the father and the adopting parents. As soon as she was adopted she acquired
as between parent and child the same legal status as a natural child. Therefore, she lost no right to inherit from her natural father, but, acquired an
additional right of inheritance. Wagner v. Warner', So Iowa s&!; Hilpi7'e v.
Claude, IP!) Iowa I59· A child by adoption who is adopted the second time
inherits from his first foster parents. Dreyer v. Shriek, IOS Kansas 495. Appellants relied on the case of In re Klapp's Estate, I<;fl Mich. 6I5. In that case
the court held that all right of inheritance was destroyed by the subsequent
adoption of the child to another by the adopting parents. The decision was
by a divided court, however, and as far as can be learned, has not been
followed in any other jurisdiction. It has been disapproved in the case of
Dr.eyer v. Schrick, 105 Kansas 495, and the contrary was held in Patterson v.
Browning, I46 Ind. I6o, and in Villier v. Watson Admti'~., 168 Ky. 63I. The
defect in the reasoning of the Michigan case is this : While a new domestic
relation was created by the second adoption, the first adoption proceeding is
in no way affected by the second. The first proceeding stands for all time
unless formally annulled on sufficient grounds. The reason is that stated
above that the child upon adoption acquires the same legal status as a natural
child of the adopting parents. It is clear that there was no estoppel in the
case, defendants as well as plaintiffs had constructive notice of the articles
of adoption, and it has been held by a long line of decisions that where the
facts are equally within the knowledge of both parties, or where they have
equal means of ascertainiJ,ig the. truth there can be no estoppel. Logan v.
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Davis, 147 Iowa 441; Busby v. Busby, 137 Iowa 37; Crockett v. Cohen, 82 W,.
284; Blodgett v. Perry, 97 Mo. 263; and Cantley-v. Morgan, 41 S. E. 201.

Va.

AI>vsst PosstssroN-Rz:coGNmoN oF TxTI.t IN ANO'tm:it-TACKING.-

Plaintiff sought to quiet title to land on theory of adverse possession, the
defendant holding the title of record. One A had been in possession in x88o
as tenant of one S. In 1903 S deeded the land to A but description did not
include the land in question. Plaintiff derived title from A. Held, plaintiff
has failed to show title in himself and so his action cannot be maintained.
Wilhelm v. Herron (Mich., 1920), 178 N. W. 76g.
It is a peculiar circumstance that the plaintiff, having so many plausible
theories on which he might succeed was unable to succeed on any one of
them. While it is true that A's possession as a tenant was the possession of
S, yet as to everyone else it was hostile and so might ripen into title. Skipwith v. Marlin, 50 Ark. 141. In the principal case, this possibility was denied
and the court held that if anyone got title it was S. The plaintiff further contended that the adverse possession of A should be tacked to that of S and this
contention may be supported either by the Kentucky theory that tacking does
not require privity, Shannon v. Kinney, I A. K. Marsh 3, or by the doctrine
that even though privity be necessary, continuity of possession by mutual consent is sufficient; McNeely v. Langan, 22 Oh. St. 32. Finally, the plaintiff
being in possession, and title conceded to have been in S, as against everyone else, he might well be entitled to a decree quieting title. The court did
not apply the doctrine that po_ssession is good against the whole world except
the true owner but maintained that as against the title of record, the plaintiff
must show title in himself.
BAII;MtNTs-GRATUITOUS BAii.OR

NEED ONLY WARN OF DtFECTS OF

Hi:: KNows.-An owner of a motortruck gratuitously lent it to an
employee to attend a celebration. One riding in the truck on invitation of the
borrower was killed due to a defect in the body of the truck. In an action to
recover damages from the bailor, held, the owner was not liable for failure to
warn of defects of which he djd not know even though he might well have
known them. Johnson v. H. M. Bullard Co. (Conn., 1920), III Atl. 70.
Cases involving the duties and liabilities of the gratuitous bailor are
few. Before the law was settled in England as to the liability of such a bailor
for defects in the bailed chattel which were unknown to him, it had been
decided that concealment of known defects would make him liable. Levy v.
Langridge, 4 M. & W. 337; Winterbottom v. Wf'ight, 10 M. & W. 107. When
the question arose in Blakemore v. Bristol & E~eter Ry. Co., 8 Ellis & B.
1035, as to the bailor's liability for unknown defects, the court accepted the
principles which Pothier and Story had drawn from the Roman law, and
held the bailor not liable. Thus we have another illustration of the influence
of the Roman law upon the English law of bailments. As is pointed out in
the Blakemore case the fact that the bailor received nothing for the use of
his chattel, should render him less liable than if the bailment were for the
mutual benefit of both parties. It is settled that in a bailment for hire, the
WHICH
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bailor is liable for injuries resulting from the defective condition of the thing
bailed, whether known or unknown, if with the exercise of due care the defect could have been discovered. Moriarty v. Porter, 49 N. Y. Supp. n07. In
Coughlin v. Gilleson, [1899] I Q. B. 145, a gratuitous lender of a donkey
engine was held not liable for injuries caused from defects of which he was
not aware, and in McCarthy v. Young, 6 Hurl. & N. 329, a gratuitous bailor
of a scaffold was not liable for an injury to the borrower's servant caused by
a defect unknown to the owner. The American authorities on the point seem
confined to the case of Gagnor v. Dana, 69 N. H. 264, holding the bailor not
liable for injuries caused by unknown defects in a staging. See infra, p. 1o8.
CoMMON C.ARRttRs-TAXICAB Sr:RVIct.-The plaintiff engaged a taxicab
awaiting employment at a street comer and upon reaching his destination was
injured in alighting. In a suit upon an accident policy stipulating double
liability if injured "while on a public conveyance provided by a common carrier for passenger service," held, the company owning the cab was a common
carrier of passengers and the cab was a public conveyance. Anderson v.
Fidelity and Casualty Co. (N. Y., 1920), 127 N. E. 584
A common carrier of passengers is one who undertakes for hire to carry
all persons indifferently who may apply for passage so long as there is room
and there is no legal excuse for r!!fusing. Shoemaker v. Kingsbury, 12 Walt
(U. S.) 369. In the principal case the holding out was evidenced by the taxicab company sending its cabs along the streets to look for "fares." If a
carrier of goods professes to serve all indiscriminately, although he does not
do so, he is a common carrier and not a private carrier. Lloyd v. ·Haugh, 223
Pa. St. 148. Persons may be common carriers although they have no reguJar
tariff of charges. Jackson Architectural Iron Works v. Hurlbut, 158"N. Y.
34- Or make no charge to the particular passenger. N orion v. Western R. R.
Corporation, 15 N. Y. 444- The service may be limited in any way so long as
it is available to all who choose to use it. .Afthough the carrier offers t(> serve
all who apply, persons are not -passengers until their offer to become passengers is accepted expressly or impliedly by the carrier. Bricker v. Philadelphia anti Reading Railroad Co., 132 Pa. St. 1; Warren v. Fitchburg Railroad Co., 8 Allen (Mass.) 227. It would see~ therefore, that although the
relation of carrier and passenger is not established until acceptance of the
passenger's offer to employ, the status of the carrier as such is created by the
offer to carry indiscriminately. The proprietors of livery stables, letting out
cabs with drivers, are not common carriers per se. Stanley v. Steele, 77 Conn.
688; Payne v. Halstead, 44 Ill. App. 97. A corporation is a common carrier
or not depending upon the powers exercised rather than the powers conferred and.where it carries passengers and goods between railroad terminals
and hotels ·and also does a garage business with individuals it is a common
carrier as to the terminal and hotel business but not as to the garage busi~
ness. Terminal Taxicab Co. v. District of Columbia, 241 U. S. 252. The
principal consequences of the status of common carrier of passengers are (I)
the duty to carry all who apply unless legally excused, and (2) to exercise
the highest degree of care and foresight possible in the selection and manipu-
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lation of the means employed. It is submitted that the true test for the existence of the former duty is the "holding out" whereas the true test for the
existence of the latter duty is the exclusive control over the selection and
manipulation of the means employed. Where the question of common carrier or not, arises collaterally, as in the principal case arid in the interpretation of statutes, the "holding out" would seem the proper test. Where the
question arises to determine the duty of care, as in the passenger elevator
cases, the latter test is usually applied and the former ignored. It follows
however, that it is error to hold, as has been done in many cases, the elevator
a common carrier, but correct to hold the operator to the same duty of care
as common carriers c1f passengers. In Seaver v. Bradley, 179 Mass. 329, a
correct result was reached in holding that the owner of an elevator was not
a common carrier. The question was whether a public statute, giving a
remedy for the loss of life of a passenger by reason of the legligence of common carriers of passengers, could be invoked. The "holding ·out'' test was
correctly applied. On principle, since they have the same exclusive control,
the. duty of care of carriers for hire should be the same as the duty of care
of common carriers of passengers. Whether a conveyance is engaged on the
street or at a garage should make no difference. Accord with principal case
are Van Hoe/fen v. Columbia Taxicab Co., 179 Mo. App. 591; Primrose v.
Casualty Co., 232 Pa. 210.
CoNS'tlTUTIONAL LAw-S'tA'l'U'rS REGm.ATING REN'ts.-In a case involving
the validity of a rent statute in the District of Columbia intended to prevent
rent profiteering during the period of the war, held, that since· this statute
favored the landlords with unrented, or building, apartments, the act was
unconstitutional because discriminatory. Willson v. McDonnell, 265 Fed. 432.
Since the limitations on the legislative power of Congress as to the District of Columbia are the same as those to which the state legislatures are
subject in regulating businesses in their respective commonwealths, the real
question involved is whether or not the business of renting houses is "affected
with a public interest," the basis upon which all regulatio11 is said to rest.
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113; German Alliance v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 38g. In
the instant case a decision as to whether the business of renting of houses and
apartments was so affected was unnecessary inasmuch as the statute was discriminatory; but since rent statutes have been passed in several states, such a
decision as the present is a mere postponement of the necessity of deciding
the fundamental question. For a_ full discussion as to when businesses may
be saiii to be "affected with a public interest," see "Price Regulation under
the Police Power," supra, p. 74Colll'ORATloNs-No-PAR VALUF. SrocK-VA1.uA-r10N FOR FRANcms~ F~
PURPOsi;s.-A corporation was organized in Delaware under an act permitting
corporations to issue stock without any nominal or par value, the statute
stipulating that for· franchise fee purposes such no-par value stock shall be
taken at the par value of $100. After qualifying as a foreign co~oration to
do business in Michigan, the corporation objected to paying its franchise fee
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on the basis set up by Delaware. Held, the no-par value stock of the corporation must be taken at par value of $100 for Michigan franchise fee purposes. Detroit Mortgage Corporation v. Vaughan, Sec. of State (Mich.,
1920), 178 N. W. 6cJ7.
Twelve states-Alabama, California, Delaware, Maryland, Maine, New
Hampshit:e, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Wisconsin
-authorize the issuance of no-par value stock. Nine set up certain standards
of valuation of such stock for franchise fee purposes, six fixing a $100 per
share basis, like Delaware. That a state may prescribe conditions under which
corporations may be organized, and that conditions prescribed by a state become a part of the corporate charter are recognized rules. The point of contention has been how other states shall treat such conditions. A state having
no statute authorizing the issuance of no-par value stock should not exclude
a foreign corporation because it has such stock. North American Petroleum
Co. v. Hopkins, (Kan.) 181 Pac. 625. The dissenting opinion in the latter
case emphasized the difficulty of determining fees and taxes without a definite
stock valuation, and it was to bridge this gap that Massachusetts by statute
set up a $100 per share basis for taxing no-par value stock of foreign corporations. (1918, Chap. 235, p. ~) The Michigan court in the instant
opinion leans towards adopting the valuation set upon the stock by the state
authorizing it, rather than setting. a fixed valuation for all cases. An it)teresting question will arise when a state like Michigan comes to tax the no-par
value stock of a foreign corporation whose state of nativity sets no value
on such stock for franchise fee purposes. At least two states-New York
and Ohio--by statute agree with the Kansas court in North American Petroleum Co. v. Hopkins, (supra), that in such cases the aggregate assets employed by the corporation in carrying on business in the state seems the most
reasonable basis of valuatiQn for taxllig purposes. See 64 OHIO LAW Btn.r..
379-

CoRPO:RATIONs-0FnotRs-CoMPSNSATION oF OFnctts.-The plaintiff, a
mining engineer,.sought to recover the reasonable value of services rendered
while vice-president of the defendant mining corporation at its request. The
work done included the drawing of maps, plans, surveys, and drafting a
mining lease. Plaintiff failed to. show an express contract on the part of the
defendant to pay. The trial court dismissed the complaint. Held, (Andrews.
Collins and McLaughlin, JJ., dissenting), an express contract not necessary,
and under .the evidence there was a proper question for the jury whether the
services were accepted under cirrunµ;tances as to raise an implied promise
to pay. Fo~ v. Arctic Co., (N. Y., 1920) 128 N. E. 154The rule of law held applicable in both the majority and minority
opinions is that for services rendered by an officer of a corporation outside
of bis regular duties, an officer may recover the contract price if there is an
express contract, and thejr reasonable value if they were rendered under circumstances so as to raise the fair presumption the parties intended and understood that they were to be paid for, the dissenting opinion however maintaining that there was no evidence that would justify a jury in finding such an
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understanding. The principal case is in harmony with the decided weight
of authority as to the question of law involved. Notley v. First State Bank
of Vicksburg, 154 Mich. 676; Pew v. Gloucester Nat'l Bank, 130 Mass. 391.
See also note in 136 Am. St. Rep. 923, and cases there cited. Alabama however has extended the rule that directors have no power to vote themselves
compensation, to services outside regular duties and has held that it is illegal
for a director to make a contract for compensation for work done while a
director of the corporation, and such a contract even though express is unenforceable. State v. Collins, 7 Ala. 95; Godbold v. Branch Bank, I I Ala.
191. A middle course has been taken, and perhaps the most salutary rule
formulated, in Althouse v. Cobaugh Colliery Co., 227 Pa. 58o, where the right
.of recovery for services rendered by an officer of a corporation is limited to
-cases where there is an express contract and the doctrine of implied contracts is repudiated. On the whole it seems that the Pennsylvania doctrine
is more nearly calculated to do justice in the majority of cases and would
make extortionate claims by grasping officers increasingly difficult.
CRIMIN.AI, LAW-INTOXICATION AS DSF.£NSt.-Defendant while in the act
of raping a girl so placed his hand upon her mouth, to stop her cries, that
she was choked to death. There was some evidence that he was drunk at
the time. He was convicted of murder by the trial court, which conviction
the appellate court reduced to manslaughter on account of his intoxication.
In the House of Lords it was held, that intoxication, as distinct from insanity,
was not a defense to the charge of murder. Director of Public Prosecutions
v. Beard, [I!)20] App. Cas. 479.
The precise argument of the defense is obscure. It was admitted that
-defendant was not too drunk to realize what he was doing in respect to the
rape. A contention that he was too drunk to have formed a specific intent
to kill the deceased is precluded by the fact that murder does not require a
specific intent to kill. "Homicide per inforlunium is felonious, if the killing
{)Ccurred in the prosecution of an unlawful act. It is murder, if the unlawful
act was a felony, although there may have been no intention to injure the
deceased." Bob (a slave) v. State, 29 Ala. 20; Smith v. State, 154 Ala. 31;
Hamilton v. State, 129 Ga. 747; People v. Stein, 23 Cal. App. I08; Pew's Case,
-Cro. Car. I83 (I630). It is not even essential that death be the probable
result of the act done; it is sufficient if it be the "natural" result, in the sense
that it follow naturally and without the intervention of human volition. State
v. Levelle, 34 S. C. 120; Reg. v. Horsey, 3 Fost. & F. 287, in which defendant
was held for murder as a result of arson, although he had no knowledge,
nor reason to know, that any one was in the barn which he fired. Actual
realization by the defendant that the unintentional result might follow from
the act intended seems never to have been required. The contention in the
J>rincipal case appears to have been that the defendant had exempted himself
from punishment for murder by deliberately incapacitating himself from conceiving the possible natural consequences of his felonious act. The decisions
absolutely deny this position. "If by a voluntary act he (the defendant)
temporarily casts off the restraints of reason and conscience, no wrong is
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done him if he is considered answerable for any injury which in that state
he may do to others or to society." People v. Roget's, 18 N. Y. g, citing much
English and American authority; Kenny v. People, 31 N. Y. 330; Miller v.
State, 9 Okla. Cr. 55; Com. y. Nazrwco, 224 Pa. 204; State v. Kiclwell, 62 W.
Va. 466, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1024; State v. Rumble, 81Kan.16, 25 L. R. A. (N.
, S.) 376; People v. Stein, supra. The appellate court, in the principal case, re1ied
on Rex Meacle, [1909] l K. B. 895, in which it was held that defendant who
killed his wife by striking her with a broomstick and with his fist in the
abdomen was guilty only of manslaughter, if he were so drunk that his reason
were dethroned, and he were "incapable of knowing that what he was doing
was dangerous." The House of Lords, in the principal case, held that this
broad proposition in Meade's Case "is not,.and can not be supported by authority." Unfortunately the court did not see fit specifically to overrule
Meade's Case in its particular application as well, so that it stilt stands in
confilct with the cnrrent of authority on that point.

v:

CluKINAL LAw-Sm~AmlNG AND ABtmNG.-The wife of the accused, a ''bed patient," and, in the opinion of her physician, incnrablc, wished
to die and end her.misery. At her request accused mixed Paris Green and
water in a cnp and placed it where she could reach it. She drank. and died
thereof. There was no indication that accnsed advised or encouraged such a
course, nor aided, except as aforcSaid. Upon confession in court, helcl, guilty
of murder in the first degree under CoKP. LAws, 1915, § I5192- State v.
Roberts,· (Mich., 1920) 178 N. W. 6go.
·
The· statute referred to reads, "All murder which shall be perpetrated by
means of poison, or lying in wait, or any other kind of wilful, deliberate and
premeditated killing; or shall be committed in the perpetration, or attempt to
perpetrate, any arson, rape, robbery or burglary, shalt be- deemed murder of
·the first degree, and shall be punished by solitary confinement at hard labor,
in the state prison ~or life." · The l_iw in our states is unsettled as to ~e legal
status of the act of suidde and the criminal liability of one who assists or
encourages the self destruction. In Massachusetts it is doubted if suicide
itself is a felony. Com. v. MW, 123 Mass. 42!). Bnt as it is an act JMlHM
in se, one who aids, encourages or advises it is guilty of murder, Corn. v.
BOT1Je1f, 13 Mass. 356, or manslaughter, Corn. v. Mink, supr.a. By specific
statute in New York any one who "wilfully in any manner, advises, encourages, abets or assists another person in ta.king the latter's life," is guilty of
manslaughter. See People Y. Kent, 41 Misc. 191. In Com. v. Hicks, n8 Ky•
. 637, it is stated as the law that suicide is a felony in Kentuckf and an accessory before the fact to a suicide is guilty of murder as principal in the second
degree. In Illinois suicide is not a crime. Royal Circle v. A~hterrath, 204
Ill. 54g. But one who aids, eicourages, or induces another to kill himself
makes the suicide his agent, becomes responsible for his act, and i(I thus guilty
0£ murder. Burnett v. People, 204 Ill. 208. But under the common Jaw that
responsibility could only be for solicitation, and punishable as such, Rex v.
Higgms, 2 East 5, (18or); or that of an accessory, dispunishabJe in case of
suicide, Com. v. Phillips, 16 Mass. 422; or that of a principal in the second
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degree if present, aiding and abetting. RussJU. ON Cimn:s, [9th .Ed.] 58.
In the leading case of Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. I46, largely relied upon
in the principal case, it was held that one who furnishes the poison with the
intent that another shall commit suicide with it, "administers" it in the statutory sense, and is guilty of murder, although suicide is not a crime in Ohio.
The evidence was strong, however, that the woman was forced by accused
to take the poison, which was not true in the principal case. It has been
doubted if the doctrine of Burnett v. People, supra, could be stretched to
cover just such a case as the principal one. I7 HARV. L. R:iw. 33I. Certainly
in the result, if not in the doctrine stated, the Michigan case is more extreme
than any above noted. The Texas court is contra with the clear cut holding
that as suicide is not a crime, one who furnishes the means, or encourages
the act, is guilty of no crime. Grace v. State, 69 S. W. 529; Saunders v. State,
54 Tex. Crim. Rep. IOI.
EAsl!MENTs-NoN-UsltR NOT ABANDONMENT.-Predecessors in· title of
plaintiff conveyed property to the predecessors of defendant railway, reserving a right of way across it to grantor's land. For fifteen years the dominant
estate was used in connection with a mill, which burned down in 1900, since
when land had been used as a depositing place for gravel, and most of the
time ·a different crossing had been used. Since about I905, the servient owners
kept the crossing blocked with cars, and in I9I4 built a platform across it.
After complaints from plaintiff, the servient owners agreed to arrange the
matter, but failed to do so, continuing the obstruction until the present action
to enjoin defendant-from obstructing the way, defendant claiming that there
was an abandonment of the easement. Held, the easement was not abandoned,
but due to laches of the plaintiff, he is entitled merely to damages, but not an
injunction. McMorran Milling Co. v. Pere Marquette Ry. Co. (Mich., 1!)20)
I78 N. W. 274It was decided in Day v. Walden, 46 Mich. 575, that an easement established by grant cannot be extinguished by any period of non-user. But some
doubt seems to be cast on the rule in Jones v. Van Bochove, I03 Mich. g8,
by an intimation that a prescriptive easement may be lost by mere non-user
for the prescriptive period, and that there should be no difference between an
easement lying in grant and one gained by prescription. The latter statement is certainly logical. But as to extinguishment of a prescriptive easement, the better doctrine seems to be that non-user for the prescriptive period
is merely evidence of an abandonment. Pratt v. Sweetser, 68 Me. 344; see
WASHBURN, EASEMENTS, .[4th ed.]. p. 720. The principal case clears any doubts
about the rule as to easements lying in grant by announcing the correct rule
that mere non-user, for however long continued, cannot extinguish an easement lying in grant. Lathrop v. Elsner, 93 Mich. 599; Arnold v. Stevens, 24
Pick. Io6; Hughes v. Galttsha Stove Co., n8 N. Y. S. 109; Harris v. Curtis,
I24 N. Y. S. 263. But non-user of a way, even one lying in grant, for no
matter how short a time, if accompanied by intention to abandon, extinguishes
the easement. Regina v. Chorley, I2 Q. B. 5I5; Crain v. Fa~, x6 Barb. I85.
Whether there is intent to abandon depends upon the facts of each case, and
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must be shown to be clear and unequivocal. "It is one thing not to assert an
intention to use a way, and another thing to assert an intention to abandon it."
Sir Edward Fry in James v. Stevenson-, 18 A. C. 162; Johnson. v. Stitt, 21 R.
I. 429. If the dominant owner h\ls led others to believe the way to be abandoned, he will be estopped to claim the easement. Trimble v. King, 131 Ky.
· I. In the principal case, there could be no estoppel, since the dominant owner
.-constantly protested.
EASE:ME:N'tS-USE: OF WAJ.,L l!OR ADVE:R'rISlNG-IRRE:vOCABLE: PRIVlLE:GE:.-

Plaintiff contracted in writing with the defendant, for the privilege to paint
and maintain signs upon the walls of defendant's building. In an action for
an injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with this privilege,
held, the authority or right to use the wa1Is in question was not merely permissive, but amounted to the grant of a right in the nature of an easement and
was not a mere revocable license. Th"omas Cusack Co. v. Jtfyers (Iowa, 1920),
178 N. W. 401.
There was no dominant estate in this case and if an easement existed, it
must be an easement in gross. Easements in gross are generally recognized
in this country and are not revocable at will. New York v. Law, 125 N. Y.
JSo. The courts have had great difficulty in distinguishing between easements
in gross and mere licenses. See 27 YALE: L. JoUR. 66. The right to place
advertising on walls has been heid to imply a right of way upon the land
sufficient to create a burden ill the nature of an easement. Willoughby v.
Lawrence, n& Ill. II. If the right is granted in the form of a lease, and involves pl>ssession of the land, it.is treated as a lease. C. J. Gude Co. v. Farley,
58 N. ·Y. Sup. 1036. Most of the advertising cases in the books involve signboards. One can have an easement for the support of a sign-board from a
wall just the same as if it were supported from the soil direct. Moody v.
Steggles, 12 Ch. D. 261. A mere naked license is founded upon personal confidence and is therefore not assignable. Morrill v. Mackman, 24 Mich. 282.
"The courts that maintain that the facts in the principal case constitute a
license frequently hold that an executed license for a term and for a consideration cannot be revoked. Levy v. Lo.uisville Gunning System, 121 Ky.
510; 18 AM. & ENG. ENCY. [2d Ed.] II44Evtm:N~-D1scovr:RY oF Doctn.l:tN'tS-Pluvn.E:Ga-Plaintiffs, in a claim
for an estate, make application for the production of certain documents.
Defendants, who are the executors of the estate, claim professional privilege
ior the documents, as they were written by one of the executors in his proiessional capacity of attorney, for the use of the executors, and further, that
fraud of att"omey and client has not been sufficiently alleged. Held, the com1DU!lications were privileged. O'Rourke v. Darbishire, [1920] A. C. 581.
The House of Lords passes squarely on the question of whether professional privilege is not displaced by the fact that the solicitor consulted is
bimself one of the trustees, and is acting as professional adviser to himself
and his co-trustees. In Re Postlethwaite, 35 Ch. D. 722, North, J., was of the
<>pinion that such a communication was not privileged, but the Lords, in the
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principal case, after overruling this decision, justify themselves on the ground
that the basis of his decision was the proprietary right in the plaintiffs, and
not that the privilege was destroyed; but saying, nevertheless that if the
decision was based on the latter ground, it was wrong. The American cases
touching on this point are decided on the basis of an attorney aiding a client
in a fraud, and hence not privileged, although there are two decisions pointing
in the opposite direction from the English case. In l ea11es v. Fridenberg,
3 PA. LAW JOURNAL, 199, the court holds that an attorney is not privileged
from communicating facts concerning his client where the attorney himself
is a party to the transaction he is called: upon to disclose, and in Matter of
Robinson, 140 N. Y. App. Div. 329, 336, the court in considering the question
of an attorney's privilege, says, ''When the corporation made him (the attorney) a director, and he accepted that office, such acceptance necessarily removed him from the ·relation of attorney or counsel to its officers so far as
the corporate affairs were concerned." If the courts are called upon to order
the production of an opinion written by "A" in his capacity as attorney to "A"
in his capacity as executor, we would see a further application of this rather
unique point. The question whether an attorney can be examined as a witness
against his client in case of an attempt to perpetrate a fraud has been discussed in a great number of cases with varying results. Matthews v. Hoagla11d, 48 N. J. i.Eq. 455, 21 Atl. 1054; 66 Am. St. Rep. 237, note. In the
O'Rourke case the Court points out the difficulty involved in the application
of the rule that fraud will defeat the objection of privilege, for assuredly if
merely crying fraud before a privileged communication lays it bare for inspection, the long standing rule of privilege as to communications between
attorney and client has ceased to be of any practical benefit; while on the
other hand, if the evidence by which fraud is to be proved cannot be obtained,
the law has opened another avenue by which justice may be evaded. The
court. definitely settles that the mere allegation of fraud is insufficient, bui:
that there must be something to give color to the charge, and that while every
case must be decided upon its own merits, Reg. v. Co:r, 14 Q. B. 153, 175,
the plaintiff must show to the satisfaction of the court good grounds for saying that prima facie a state of things exists, which if not displaced at the
trial will support a charge of fraud to rebut the presumption of privilege.
Evmr:NC:r:-MovING P1c:TUREs-Br:s-r Evmr:Nci; RULr:.-In a woman's action
under the Civil Rights Law for damages for exhibition without written consent of a motion picture of Caesarean operation, testimony of witnesses who
had seen the picture as t.hrown o~ the screen in theaters, held, admissible to
show it represented the plaintiff and could be identified as her picture. Feeney
v. You11g (1920), 181 N. Y. Sup. 481.
There is considerable room for doubt whether the film would constitute
best evidence, were the best evidence rule applicable in this case; because the
film was so small that it could not be made out, and also because the presentation upon the screen constituted the offense under the statute. The best
evidence rule applies to written instruments. Western Assur. Co. v. Polk,
104 Fed. 649; Orr v. Le Claire, 55 Wis. 93. But where the writing is not in
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issue, but merely collateral to it, the rule has no application, and parol evi"dence may be given, eve.n though it covers the contents of the writing. Coonrod v. Madden, 126 Ind. 197; Ledford v. Emerson, 138 N. C. 502. It is generally held that except in cases of written instruments or records, although
there may be more satisfactory means of knowledge, there is no higher grade
of testimony as a means of communicating facts to a jury, than the statement
of a wittiess who has himself had the best means of knowledge. Clark v.
Robinson, 5 B. Monr. 55; Commonwealth v. Morrill, 99 Mass. 540;. Commonwealth v. Welch, 142 Mass. 473. In Lucas v. Williams, [18gz] 2 Q. B. II3,
it was held in an action on the infringement of a copyright of a painting by
publishing a photographic copy of it that proof of the photograph being a copy
was allowable without requiring production of the painting. The cases above
mentioned involve efforts to compel the production of a chattel and differ
from. those cases where a chattel is offered in evidence. The cases where
there is an inscribed chattel, production of which is sought to be compelled,
have given rise to a great mass of conflicting opinions which cannot be
reconciled. See 2 W1GM:oRS, Ev., § n82.
FRA.uns, STATUTE oF-CABr.-s 'l'RANSl!tR oF Fo~IGN ExcHANGE WITHIN

StCTION.-Plaintiff's oral agreement to deliver to defendant a cable
transfer of exchange on London, England, for 1.2o,ooo sterling within four
months at defendant's option to be·paid for in dollars at the exercise of that
option, -thereby malcing available by cable to the buyer a credit of the amount
specified at the point specified was held, either the sale of a "commodity"
or a "chose in action" within the Statute of Frauds and unenforceable.
Equitab~e Trust Co. of N. Y. v. Keene, (1920) 183 N. Y. Supp. 699.
The New York Statute of Frauds expressly includes choses in action. "A
contract to sell or a sale of any goods or choses in action", I'ERsoNAL PlloP.
~LEW, Ste. 85, Cir. 45, LAws 1909, CoNso:r. LAw, c. 41. Section 156 of the
PasoNAI. PRoPJtRTY LAW defines· "goods" as including "alt chattels personal
other than things in action and money." So money is not considered as goods
under the New York statute. In order then for the contract to sett 12,000
pounds to come within the statute it wilt have to appear that said pounds are
not considered money. There is authority for this view. Foreign money
when dealt in in this country is to be regarded as a commodity. Reisfeld v.
Jacobs, 176 N. Y. Supp. 223. Even domestic money (gold) when the subject
of a contract of sale, has been regarded not as money but as a commodity,
and a contract for the sate thereof was held to be within the Statute of
Frauds. Peabody v. Speyers, 56 N. Y. 230; Fowler v. N. Y. Gold E~change
Bank, 67 N. Y. 138; Cooke v. Davis, 53 N. Y. 318. In view of these authorities the court had ample reason for holding that the contract to transfer the
· title to 12,000 English pounds was within the statute. This was on the theory
that the sale of a cable transfer of exchange was the sate of a commodity.
But the court went still further and held that it might also be considered as
the sale of a chose in action. The plaintiff's contention was that this was
r.eally a provision of credit and that credit meant "the capacity of being
"trusted." Plaintiff cited in· support of this contention Dry Dock Bank v•.
I7l':S:
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American Life Ins. and Trust Co., 3 N. Y. 344- That case held that the term
"chose in action" means a particular species of property, recognized by law,
and which, on the death of the owner would be inventoried as such by his
legal representatives, and. does not include credit, and, though credit niay be
a benefit to the possessor as a means of procuring property, it is not in itself
recognized in law as property. The defect in the plaintiff's reasoning lay in
the fact that they failed to see that the agreement in the principal case was
not credit in the true sense at all. Credit in its true sense, to be sure, means
the capacity of being trusted just as the plaintiff contended, or the ability to
borrow money. It means that one side of the contract has been fully executed
while the other side is entirely unexecuted. In the principal case that was
not the situation. The pounds were to be paid for in American dollars as
fast as the title to them was transferred. There was no element of borrowing. There was really no element of credit involved. What defendant wanted
and what he got was the right to call upon London for so many pounds of
exchange. This was clearly a chose in action. The title was still in the
vendor while the right to the possession was in the vendee by virtue of the
contract. Undoubtedly then the court was right in holding that on either of
the above theories the contract was within the Statute of Frauds and therefore unenforceable.
lN'n:RNAL ~Ntnr-INcoMr: TAX-Loss SusTAIN!ID IN OuTsm:e SPitcuI.ATION NOT D:ei>ucnm.:e-"Loss~ lNCtJRIIS> IN TRAD:e."-The taxpayer, a
member of Mente & Co., who were engaged in making jute and cotton bags,
in his income report for the years 1913 and 1914 deducted from his gross income, losses sustained in buying and selling cotton on the Cotton Exchange
for his private account, as "losses incurred in trade." The Income Tax Act
Oct. 3, 1!)13, Sec. II, Subd. 2B (38 STAT. 167) provides: "That in computing
net income for purposes of normal tax there shall be allowed as deduction:
***fourth, losses actually sustained during year,.incurred in trade,***·" The
Collector of internal revenue assessed a tax on these deductions which the
taxpayer paid under protest. In an action to recover the amounts so paid,
held, (Manton, J., dissenting) "in trade" was rightly construed by the Collector as meaning in the actual business of the taxpayer, as distinguished from
isolated transactions. Mente v. Eisner (C. C. A. 20d Circ., 1920), 266 Fed. 161. ·
The majority opinion goes on to say that although it is somewhat inconsistent to tax the profits of such transactions without allowing deductions for
loss, yet if intent had been to permit all losses to be deducted, the statute
would say so. Treasury Decision 2090 construes correctly "in trade" to
mean "the trade or trades in which he has invested money otherwi~e than
for purpose of being employed in isolated transactions." Manton, J., dissenting, considered that what the taxpayer did here, selling cotton futures, was
engaging "in trade." Trade as defined by BotJ\'l:ER is "any sort of dealings
by way Of sale or exchange." The interpretation put upon· "in trade" by the
Collector as synonymous with "in his business" is too narrow. That the
Income Tax Act of 1913 has been amended by the Act of 1918, Sec. 214 Subd.
s (40 STAT. 1007), providing deduction of "losses*** if incurred in any trans-
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action entered into for profit, though not connected with the trade or business
* * *,'' may be deducted, tends to show that the interpretation put upon the
previous law was not according to the intent of Congress.
INTERNATIONAL LAW-ALttN's CAPACITY TO INHERIT LAND-E1n:i;CT OF
'WAR ON TutAms.-Intestate owned land in New York. One of his two surviving daughters, plaintiff in this case, had married an Austro-Hungarian
subject resident in the United States. Shortly before intestate's death war
was declared between Austria-Hungary and the United States. The New
York -Real Property Law, Sec. IO, enabled "alien friends" to acquire land in
New York by descent. 7 CONSOL. LAWS, (211d Ed.), 7269. The Treaty of
Commerce and Navigation between Austria-Hungary and the United States,
Art. 2, provided that where citizens of either country should be incapable
under the laws of the other of acquiring land by descent they should be
allowed at least two years to sell lands which they would otherwise inherit
and to withdraw the proceeds. 9 STAT. 944; 2 MALLOY, TRtATms, 34- Could
plaintiff inherit New York land? If not, had she a right to disv.;se of it as
provided in the Treaty? Held, that plaintiff could not inherit land under the
New York law, but that she had a right to dispose of land which she would
otherwise inherit as provided in the Treaty. The Treaty with Austria-Hun~. at least as regards the articl~ in controversy, was compatible with a state
of hostilities and had not been suspended by war. Techt v. Hughes, (New
York, I920), I28 N. E. I85.
At common law an alien, friend or enemy, could not take land by descent.
See I Pol.LOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY oF ENGLISH LAW, [2nd Ed.], 459; 2
BLACKSTONS, Co1.un;:NTARI1'S, 249; Dawson's Lessee v. Godfrey, 4 Cr. 32I. By
virtue of the Citizenship Act of I907, Sec. 3, which provides that "any American woman who marries a foreigner shall take the nationality of her bus. band,'' plaintiff had become an alien. 34 STAT. I228; Mackenzie v. Hare, 239
U. S .. 299· Upon the outbreak of war with Austria-Hungary she had become
an alien enemy. Reliance upon Sec. IO of the Real Property Law proved
unavailing, since an alien enemy could not be regarded as an "alien friend"
upon any reasonable construction. The Court's opinion upon this point is
well considered and sound. It would have been no occasion for surprise if
plaintiff's reliance upon the Treaty had proved equally precarious. There
has been much diversity of opinion as regards the effect of war on treaties.
It has been said that war abrogates treaties, with a few exceptions, and that
their renewal, if desired, must be expressly stipulated. 3 PHir..t.WORt, INT.
LA.w, [3rd Ed.], 794; 2 W£STLAK1', INT. LAW, [211d Ed.], 32. On the other
hand, a majority of the modem publicists emphasize the exceptions. 2 CoBBSTT, CAsi;:s, [3rd Ed.], 40; HALL INT LAw, [7th Ed.], Sec. 125; 2 0PPSNHJUH, INT. LAW, [2nd Ed.], Sec. 99. It is difficult to extract a general rule
from the practice of nations. Publicists usually resolve the difficulty By resort to classification. It is found upon classification that certain treaties
become operative only in case of war, that others may continue operative in
case of war by express stipulation (see Fritz Schulz, Jr., Co. v. Raimes & Co-.,
164 N. Y. Supp. 454), that others may be suspended during war, and that
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others may be abrogated. Treaties of commerce and navigation are usually
included either among those which are suspended or among those which are
abrogated. The New York court adopts a sensible pragmatic test, commended
by several of the modern writers on international law, and holds that treaty
provisions compatible with a state of hostilities, unless expressly terminated,
should be enforced by the courts and those incompatible rejected. The mere
fact that other provisions of the same treaty must be suspended or even
abrogated is not conclusive. In the words of Mr. Justice Cardozo, "International law today does not preserve treaties or annul them, regardless of
the effects produced. It deals with such problems pragmatically, preserving
or annulling as the necessities of war exact. It establishes standards, but it
does not fetter itself with rules." In Techt v. Hughes the New York Court
of Appeals has contributed an admirable decision and an illuminating
precedent.
LANDLORD AND TsNAN'l'-TtNDtR OJ? Rr:N'l' BY HoLDING-0VtR TsNAN'tAcctP'l'ANCS BY LANDLORD O'tHSR.WISS THAN AS Rr:NT.-Lessor gave notice
properly for tenant to quit premises. Tenant held on and sent rent to lessor
who retained it but insisted that he was receiving the money not as rent but
for use and occupation. In an action to recover possession of the premises,
held, even though the lessor denied recognition of the tenancy as existing,
the acceptance of the money operated as a waiver of the notice to quit.
Harlell v. Blackler, [1920] 2 K. B. 161.
So also in the case of Croft v. Lumley, 5 E. & B. 648, where the lease was
forfeited by breach of covenants, the lessor was held to waive the forfeiture
by retaining money paid as rent, though he insisted he accepted it not as rent
but for use and occupation. In that case the judges applied the maxim:
"Money paid is to be applied according to the express will of the payer, not
of the receiver." "Such acceptance operates as a matter of law to waive all
forfeitures then known to the lessor, notwithstanding any protest on his part
against such waiver," WooDl?ALL, LANDLORD AND TENANT. Generally any
recognition by a lessor of a tenancy as existing, after a right of entry has
accrued and lessor has notice of the forfeiture, will have the effect of a
waiver. Dermott v. Wallach, I Wall. 61. So the acceptance of rent by a
lessor is waiver of forfeiture or notice to quit. The landlord affirms that
the lease is still in effect by accepting rent. McGlynn v. Moore, 25 Cal. 384;
Totalis v. Cannellos, 138 Minn. 179. And this even though the lessor expressly
remonstrates against it being a waiver of a prior cause of forfeiture. G. C.
& S. F. Ry. Co. v. Settegast, 79. Tex. 256. But payment must be made as
rent. It is not waiver if made as compensation for use and occupation. Kenny
v. Sen Si Lun, 101 Minn. 253; Croft v. Lumley, 5 E. & B. 648. To render
acceptance of rent waiver of forfeiture, at time of acceptance the lessor must
have knowledge of the cause of forfeiture. German-American Bank v. Gollmet', 155 Cal. 683.
LANDLORD AND TuNAN't-W.AS'tt.-The lessee of a building with office
space on the second floor planned to alter the second story for a sublessce by
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cutting windows ·and doors in a party wall to connect the building with the
adjoining structure. The lessor, claiming this alteration would materially
injure the building and increase insurance costs, sought an injunction. Held,
the lessee is guilty of waste, for the common Jaw rule that a tenant is guilty
of waste if he materially changes the nature and character of the building, is
·the law in Alabama. F. W. WoQlworth Co. v. Nelso1~. (Ala., 1920) 85 So. 449.
The old common law interpretation of waste was applied with strictness.
If a tenant converted arable land into wood, or meadow into plow or pasture
land, even though he thus enhanced the reversioner's or lessor's estate, it was
waste, because it was held to endanger the evidences of title. Br:wr:s, LAW oJ!
WASTS, p. 10; London v. Greyme, (1007) Cro. Jae. 181. As early as l8o3 a
North Carolina court announced that the definition of waste under the common law in England was inapplicable in America where conditions were so
different. Ward v. Sheppard, 2 Hayward 283. An act of a tenant which was
"not prejudicial to the inheritance" was held no waste. Pynchon v. Steams,
II Mete. (Mass.) 304; Clemence v. Steere, l R. I. 272. Even England relaxed the severity of its ancient rule. Doherty v. Allman, (1878) 3 App. Cas.
7bg. Today -0ne group of courts agree with the holding in the instant case on
similar facts. Peer v. Wadsworth, 67 N. J. 191; Hamburger v. Settegast,
(Texas) 131 S. W. 639. The general tendency, though, has been to restrict
the application of the old law of waste, and to adapt the law to the conditions of a ne~ and growing country. TttFANY, 'Rr:AL P.RoP., p. 561; Pynchon
v. Stearns, supra. Under the more modem view to constitute waste the
alterations must be of a material and permanent nature, and must so change
the property as to depreciate the value of the inheritance. Tir:Dr:YAN, Rr:AI.
Pl!.oP., [2nd Ed.] Sec. 73. Whether an act is detrimental to the lessor and is
therefore waste is a question of fact for the jury.· I WASHBURN, Rr:AL. PROP.,
{5th Ed.] 153; Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 104 Wis. 7. At the present time
it is to the interest of the public that a tenant should be hampered as little
as possible by restrictions vexatious to him without being of proportional
advantage to his lessor, who can, if he desires, protect himself by definite
covenants_ in the lease. Modem authority seems to be fast realizing the reasonableness of this view, and the narrowness of the view of the principal case.
Lmr:r. AND SLANDSR-PtraI.ICA'l'ION TO EMPLOYttS oJ! Dr:ttNDANT-CoNDl'l'IONA.L Pluvn.Ir:Gr:.-The plaintiff was the addressee and receiver of a libellous letter written partly by the bookkeeper- and partly by the general manager of the defendant corporation; the letter bafore being mailed was shown
to the bookkeeper and the collector for the purpose of ascertaining whether
the statements were in .conformity with the facts as they understood them.
iIeld, the occasion was conditionally privileged, and, there being no malice,
the publication of the letter was not actionable. Globe Furniture Co. v.
Wright, (C. A., Dist of Col., 1920) 265 Fed. 873.
In solving such a case two questions present themselves : is the communication of a libellous letter by one employee of a corporation to another
employee of the corporation in the ordinary course of business a publication
by the corporation? If such a communication is a publication, is it condi-
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tionally privileged? The answers given by the courts differ. In Oiuen v.
Ogilvie Publishing Co., (1898) 32 App. Div. 465, 53 N. Y. Supp. 1033, it was
held that the dictation of a libellous letter by the manager of a corporation
to a stenographer, an employee of the corporation, who copied and mailed
the same, did not constitute publication by the corporation. The court said,
"There was in fact but one act by the corporation, and those engaged in the
11erformance of it are not to be regarded as third pai;ties, but as common
servants engaged in the act." In Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Jones, (1916)
18 Ga. App. 414 89 S. E. 429, in Cartwright-Caps Co. v. Fischel & Kaufman,
(1917) II3 Miss. 359, 74 So. 278, and in Prins v. Holland-North America
Mortgage Co. (1919) 107 Wash. 2o6, 181 Pac. 68o, the same rule was followed. In Morgan v. Wallis (1917 K. B. Div.) 33 T. L. R 495, commented
upon in 17 MICH L. R1w. 187, it was held that there was not such a publication on the part of a private individual by the dictation to his typist as creates
a liability for libel. Obviously, where the court holds there is no publication,
the question of privilege does not arise. A number of courts, however, hold
that in such cases there is publication. In Pullman v. Hill, [1891] 1 Q. B. 524
(C. A.), it was held that the dictation of a libel by an officer of a mercantile
company to a stenographer employed by it, and its delivery to an office boy to
have press copies made, amounted to publications, that the publications were
not conditionally privileged, and hence were actionable. The court held there
was no conditional privilege because, as it said, the defendant clearly had no
duty to make the communication to the stenographer, nor had the latter any
interest in the matter. The case was followed in Gambrill v. Schooley, (1901)
93 Md. 48, where a private illdividual made the dictation to his confidential
stenographer, and similarly, in Ferdon v. Dicl~ens, (1909) 161 Ala. 181, 49
So. 888. In Bo.rsius v. Goblet Freres [1894] l Q. B. 842, it was held that the
dictation of a libellous letter by a solicitor to his stenographer in the interest
of a client's business, was a publication, but that it being in performance of
the solicitor's duty to his client was privileged on the part of the solicitor, and
that this privilege covered the ordinary method of performing his duties, including dictation of his letters to his stenographers. In Edmondson v. Birch
& Co., Ltd., [1907] 1 K. B. 371, the court said that where as between two
business firms a communication of libellous matter was conditionally privileged, that privilege covered all the reasonable means of exercising it and
those reasonable means might include the introduction of third persons.
Where the communication is conditionally privileged between the principal
parties, this doctrine, in view of modem business methods, seems most reasonable. Where, as in the. principal case, the communication is direct to the
plaintiff and does not involve the question of privilege as between the sender
and receiver, the basis of the decision in the principal case recommends itself,
i. e., where the communication is made to those who, in the natural course of
their employment, have a duty to perform with regard to it, the communication is conditionally privileged, and in the absence of malice, is not actionable.

LmtL AND SI.ANDJ>R; SLANDJ>R 011 TI'tL"E.-One Jass owned a farm, .and
gave a mortgage on it to defendant, which, since Mrs. Jass was away and
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could not execute it, was not recorded. Subsequently Jass conveyed to plaintiff by warranty deed, presumably giving plaintiff no notice of the mortgage.
Defendant, hearing of conveyance, recorded the mortgage without Mrs. Jass'
signature, to secure any interest he might still have. Plaintiff's prospective
purchaser refused to purchase, and plaintiff brings action for slander of title.
Held, defendant was not liable. Kelly & First Slate Ba11k v. Rothsay, (Minn.,
1920) 17j N. W. 347.
Where the plaintiff possesses an estate in property, an action lies against
one who maliciously and falsely denies or impugns plaintiff's title, if any
damage is thereby suffered by plaintiff. Dodge v. Colby, 1o8 N. Y. 445; Linville v. Rhoades, 73 Mo. App. 217; ODGJ>RS, LmEr. AND Sr.ANDER, [5th Ed.] p.
79; NEwtr.r., Sr.ANDER AND Lmi;:r., [3rd Ed.] p. 254; see Ann. Cas. 1913C, 136o.
The gist of the action is the damage to the plaintiff. Kendall v. Stone, S N.
Y. 14; Felt v. Germania Life Ins. Co., 133 N. Y. S. 519. An interesting
speculation arises where a conveyor of land whose first grantee fails to record,
proceeds to convey to a second grantee who records, in those states where the
first grantee recording without notice has priority, as to whether the first
grantee could sue his grantor for slander of title. One advantage of this
remedy is in the possibility of exemplary damages. Hop kins v. Drowne, 21
R I. 20. Malice is essential to the maintenance of the action, Walkley v.
Bostwick, 49 Mich. 374; but intermeddling with the property of others with
which one is not concerned is deemed malice. ODGERS, Lmi;:r. AND SLANDER,
[Sth Ed.] p. Bo. The plaintiff.must have title, Edwards v. Burris, 6o Cal. 157,
but in the.situation just suggested the plaintiff had title at the time the second
conveyance was made, and by the familiar rule of estoppel, the defendant is
estopped from denying present title in the plaintiff, his grantee. The action
of slander of title has been maintained where defendant advertised and sold
under a false mortgage, Gare v. Condon, 87 Md. 368; where defendant fraudulently recorded a deed to himself, Smith v. Autry, 16g Pac. 623; where defendant filed a claim against the land, Collins v. Whitehead, 34 Fe\i. 121;
where defendant, a subsequent grantee, recorded subsequently to plaintiff, the
prior grantee, in Louisiana, where the peculiar action of slander to try title lies.
Atchafalaya Land Co., Ltd., v. Brownell-Drews Lumber Co., Ltd., 130 La. 657.
Generally, the plaintiff must sliow that the slander prevented an actual sale; see
Lindon v. Graham, 8 N. Y. Super. Ct.670; Felt v. Gen11ania Life Ins. Co., supra
But it would seem that the purpose of this requirement is to show the special
damage, and in our hypothetical situation, where the plaintiff has lost all of
his property, he should have the remedy as well as one whose property has
simply not brought as high a price as it might have.
MASTER AND SERVANT-ScoPi;: oF EMPL<>YMENT-EMPT.On:R's L1ABn.ITY ro
THIRD Pi;:RsoNs.-The plaintiff, a minor ~hild, while riding upon defendant's
truck by permission of the driver, sustained serious injuries by reason of the
driver's wanton negligence. It was conceded that it was against the driver's
express orders to allow anyone to ride with him. In an action for damages
against ·the employer, it was held, the employer was liable. Higbee Co. v.
Jackson, (Ohio, 1920), 128 N. E. 61.
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It was formerly held that the master was not liable for the wanton and
wilful act of his servant, because the very fact of its being "wilful" precluded
the possibility of its having been within the scope of his employment. McM anus v. Crickett, I East rn6; Tuller v. Voght, 13 Ill. z17; Foster v. Esse~
Bank, 17 Mass. 479; Mali v. Lord, 39 N. Y. 381; Ry. Co. v. Baum, 26 Ind. 70.
But the modem rule is otherwise. Craker v. Ry. Co., 36 Wis. 657; Aiken v.
Holyoke St. Ry. Co., 184 Mass. 269; Magar v. Hammond, 183 N. Y. 387;
Stranahan Co. v. Coit, 55 Oh. St. 398, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 5o6, and note p. 485,
et seq.; Western Uni-On Tel. Co. v. Cattell, 177 Fed. 71. In the principal case,
the majority of the court experience no difficulty in finding that the employe
was acting in the course of and within the scope of his employment at the
time of the injury. The unauthorized permission to ride was, as to the defendant, a nullity, and when the boy got upon the truck, "He was a trespasser,
so far as the defendant was concerned." But, conceding this, he was "entitled
to the rights of a trespasser," viz., that the defendant should not, through its
employe, wantonly or wilfully injure him. Jones, J., dissenting, maintained the
view that, since the permission to ride was clearly outside the scope of the
drivt>r's employment, the defendant is not liable for the subsequent injury,
regardless of the degree of negligence e.."hibited by the employe. Of the
cases he cites to maintain his position, but one, Driscoll v. Scanlon, 165 Mass.
348, is noted by the majority opinion, wherein it is attempted to distinguish
it on the ground that there was in that case no positive act by the employe
leading to the injuzy. But, quaere, whether the omission of the servant in that
case was not as much in wanton disregard of the safety of the trespasser as
was the positive act in the principal case. It would seem that in none of the
other cases cited for this view in the dissent was the degree of negligence
passed upon and defined as being either ordinary or wanton. Schulwitz v.
Delta Lumber Co., 126 Mich. 559; Dover, Admr. v. Mayes Mfg. Co., 157 N.
C. 324; Hoar, Adm~. v. Maine Cpnt. Ry. Co., 70 Me. 65; Bowler v. O'Connell,
162 Mass. 319; Cut Stone Co. v. Pugh, II5 Tenn. 688; Kiernan v. N. 1. Ice Co.,
74 N. J. L. 175; Scott v. Peabody Coal Co., 153 Ill. App. rn3. And the last
two mentioned are clearly distinguishable from the instant case upon their
facts. The situation presented by the principal case is of common recurrence,
and the two opinions in this case represent the two points of view, between
which the courts are now divided. The majority opinion considers the question in the manner which is usually followed with regard to wanton injuries
of trespassers by employes of railroads, viz., that the railroad owes the trespasser no duty except to do him no wanton or wilful injury. Kirtley v. Ry.,
65 Fed. 386; Ry. v. Hum1,1iell, 44 Pa. St. 375; Maynard v. Ry., II5 Mass. 458;
Ry. v. Graham, 95 Ind. 286; Bresbahan v. Ry., 49 Mich. 410; Roden v. Ry.,
133 Ill. 72; Toomey v. Ry., 86 Cal. 374, IO L. R. A. 139. See supra, p. 93.
Ntcr.1c1mcs-PARtNTs' NtcLIGENCE IMPU'l'ED ro THE CHILn.-P., an infant,
three years and nine months old, while on a busy street, unattended, was injured by D's automobile. Held, that the negligence of the child's parents, in
permitting it to be on the street unattended, would be imputed to the child,
so as to defeat a recovery by him, unless he exercises the care required of
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adult persons under the circumstances. Sullivan v. Chad127 N. E. 633.
There has been much conflict in the authorities as to whether or not the
negligence of the parents would be imputed to the child, in an action brought
by it. The great weight of modem authority is, that such negligence will not
be· imputed to the child. See cases in IIO Am. St. Rep. 283. The earlier
Massachusetts cases laid down the strict rule that the negligence of the parents
would be imputed to the child so as to defeat a tecovery by it. Casey v. Smith,
(18go), 152 Mass. 294, Cotter v. Lynn & B. R. R. (1901), l8o Mass. 145·
Later Massachusetts cases modified the strict rule of the earlier cases, arid held
as in the principal case, that the child could recover, even though its parents
were negligent, if it did nothing which would be considered careless if its
movements were directed by an adult person of ordinary prudence. Wiswell
v. Doyle (1893), 100 Mass. 42, Miller v. Flash- Chemical Co. (1918), 230 Mass.
419. . The Massachusetts. court again applies a strict rule in requiring a child
of tender years to exercise the same standard of care as is required of adult
persons. In the majority.of jurisdictions in this country the plaintiff would
have recovered upon the facts of the principal case. The trial court found
a verdict for plaintiff, so it must have been shown that defendant was negligent. The negligence ·of the parents would not be imputed to the child.
Zar::ona.v. Neve Drug Co., et al .(1919), - Cal.-, 179 Pac. 203. The child
wouJd not be held to the degree of care required of adult persons, but only
to that degree of care commensurate with its age, experience, and under. standing, Lawrence v. Portland Ry. Light & Power Co. (1919), - Ore.-,
· 179 Pac. 485, and some courts hold that up to the age of seven years a child is
incapable of such conduct as well constitute contributory negligence. McDonald v. City of Spring Valley (1918), 285 Ill. 52, Quirk v. Metropolitan St.
Ry. Co. (1919), - Mo. App.-, 210 S. W. 103.
ordinarily

wick, (Mass., 1920)

· Nu1sANCt-RU.ANCS oF CoN~ISN~-SllltLTING CoMPANzts--CoJJRT OF
EQUITY RtCOGNIZts WAJJ:tur.s Ntc£SSITY.-Upon a bill to enjoin the operation of certain smelters on the ground that such operation constituted a
nuisance, the court found the sulphur fumes emitted in the "smoke stream"
of the defendants to be injurious to the crops of the plaintiffs and to be an
unlawful interference with the rightful enjoyment of their homes. The trial
was closed in 1917. Pending the pros~tion of the war no decree was made,
the court considering "that the plaintiffs could very well endure some discomfort and take the chance of economic loss in the public interest." Now held,
that though the industry to be enjoined be a valuable one, the private right
to be free from noxious fumes in the air and the injuries to crops incident to
fumes is sufficient ground for an injunction forbidding the operation of defendant's smelters. Anderson v. American Smelting and Refining Co. (U. S.
D. C. Utah, 1919), 265 Fed. 928.
Since all the factors in the case remained constant, save the element of
public convenience, _the successive rulings of the court are a demonstration
that the doctrine ,?f balance of convenience is essentially one of balance, the
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application of which depends upon the precise weight of the elements which
fall into each pan of the scales. And it may be doubted whether some of the
courts which have wholly repudiated the doctrine might not yield to it if confronted with the circumstances which were first presented in the priiicipat
<:ase. Yet it might be argued that those particular circumstances arising out
of the conduct of the war are such as no court should take into account. In
Driver v. Smith, 104 Atl. 717, the court said that it would noi: refuse specific
performance of a contract on the ground that its enforcement would be detrimental to a war industry, saying that "It would be an infolerable situation if
each court before whom the rights of individuals were to be litigated permitted
to determine whether the relief should be granted or withheld upon its
-0pinion as to whether the granting of the injunction would aid or injure
the government in its war activities." - Approved in 17 Mrc:a:. L. Rsv. 376.
And the decision in Rosenwasser Bros., Inc., v. Pepper, 172 N. Y. Sup. 310,
that the court might enjoin a strike merely on the ground that it interfered
with the prosecution of the war, was adversely criticised in 32 HARv. L. Rsv.
376. These arguments, however, are but a restatement of the objection to
the whole doctrine of the balance of convenience, that it is for the courts to
give their remedies solely upon the basis of existing legal rights, and for the
legislature to vary these rights, if the occasion requires. It is, however, by
many courts, held a proper ground for refusing an injunction against nuisance.
18 M1c:a:. L. Rsv. 703. Yet, it may be conceded, if the doctrine is to be accepted at all, there is no reason why the court should not consider, with all
the other elements in the case, the pei;uliar public interest growing out of the
prosecution of the war.
·
NUISANct-FuNmw:, HoMt IN Rr:smtN'l'IAL D1s'l'RIC't.-An undertaker
purchased and used as a funeral home a dwelling house in an exclusively
Tesidential district. The spirits of the· residents were depressed, $eir comfort and enjoyment interfered with, and their property depreciated in value.
Held, a nuisance which may be enjoined. Beisel, et al v. Crosby (Neb., 1920),
178 N. W. 272.
In the early case of Westcott v. Middleton, 43 N. J. Eq. 478, where under
similar circumstances an injunction was refused, the court emphasized the
fact that the discomfort complained of was not produced through the medium
-0£ the senses. A group of recent cases illustrates the tendency of the courts to
disregard this requirement and to recoguize that mental distress and depression, as well as physical discomfort may interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of property. In·the following cases injunctions were granted against
undertaking establishments in residential districts, though there were no
noxious odors and no danger of disease. Densmore v. Evergreen Camp No.
I47; 61, Wash. 230; Saier v. Joy, 1g8 Mich. 295; Goodrich v. Starrett, 184 Pac.
220. Injunctions against private hospitals and asylums have frequently been
granted on substantially the same grounds. Barth v. Christian Psychopathic
Hosp. Assn., 163 N. W. 62; Everett v. Paschall, 61 Wash. 47. For recent
-cases holding valid ordinances declaring it unlawful to maintain undertaking
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parlors except in business districts see City of St. Paul v. Kessler, et al.,
I78 N. W. I7I; Osborn v. City of Shreveport, I43 La. 932. See also I8 M"1c11.
L. Rm. 246.

PUBr.1c Urn,1Tits RATES-POWER oF CoMMISSION TO CHANGE CoNTRACt
RAtts.-A traction company obtained consent of the city of New York to
construct· and operate a street railway. The consent was given upon the condition that five cen~ should be the maximum fare. The successor to the
rights of the traction company applied to the Public Service Commission for
authority to charge a higher fare on the ground that the five cent fare was
inadequate to enable the company to continue service. The city secured a writ
of prohibition directed to the commission. Held, that the order issuing the
writ should be reversed. People v. Ni:ron (N. Y., Ig20), I28 N. E. 247.
This adds another to the rather variegated New York cases previously
noticed in I8 MICH. L. Rm. 320, 8o6. In those former cases the public utilities
were sometimes granted and sometimes denied release from contract rates.
The court recognizes the power of the legislature as paramount to that of the
municipality, except where there has been clear grant of the power by the
legislature to the municipality to enter into such a contract with the utility.
The instant case is decided· against the city, Hogan, J., dissenting, on the
ground that at the time the franchise was granted the law gave the commission power to raise or lower rate~,-and municipalities by their contracts "may
not nullify existing statutes. In a case decided on the same day as the Nixon
case, supra,-Niagara Falls v. Public Service Cnm. (N. Y., Ig20), I28 N. E.
247, the court in an opinion written by Hogan, J., who dissented in the Nixors
case, held that prohibition does lie to restrain action by the commission to
change fares fixed in a contract made when the New York statute gave the
commission no power over rates fixed by contract with the municipality. The
court refused to pass upon whether the legislature under the police power of
the state had the power to abrogate such agreements over the objection of
the municipality. It was enough for that case that the legislature had three
times since the decision of Quinby v. PsdJiic Sero. Com., 223 N. Y. 244 refused to confer any such power on the commission. See I8 MICH. L. Rm.
320. McLaughlin, J., dissented on the ground that the city made the contract
subject not merely to the laws as they then existed, but "as they might thereafter be changed by the legislature," citing Puget Sound T. K. and P. W. v.
Reynolds, 244 U. S. 574- See the extensive annotation of this and other cases
in 5 L. R. A. I3, 36, 44t 6o: The dissenting judge is ready to pass on the
point which the court refuses to decide, and takes the broad ground that
this police power is "something the state cannot surrender, because to do so
would be to surrender a sovereign power." Asserting that the legislature has
conferred this power upon the commission he holds that the prohibition would
not lie. In still a third case decided on the same day, People v. NiXon, 128
N. E. 255, the New York court passes on several cases, making the power of
the commission over franchises granted by municipalities depend upon the
state of the law at the time the fr11-nchise was granted. It is still an open
question in New York whether the legislature can empower the commission
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to change rates fixed in contracts made by municipalities acting under clear
legislative sanction; the court finds the legislature thus far has not given the
commission any such power and so a decision of that point has not been
necessary. Notwithstanding the numerous dissents on these cases it seems
reasonably sure that the court would decide in favor of such power in the
legislature if the legislature were to attempt to exercise it, and so it is believed would the Federal courts and most of the state courts hold. See, for
example, Public Utilities Com. v. Rhode Island Co. (R I., June 30, 1920),
uo Atl. 654, upholding the paramount authority of the state to regulate rates
through the agency of a commission. The opinion, however, quotes from
Milwaukee E. R. and L. Co. v. Railroad Com., 238 U. S. 18o, a paragraph
recognizing the right to make contracts which shall prevent the state during
a given period from exercising this power over rates, though such renunciation of a sovereign right must be so clearly and unequivocally evidenced as to
admit of no doubt. If it be in the full sense a sovereign power it is difficult
to see how it can be surrendered, no matter how clear and unequivocal the
language.
Tm: Rur.:e IN SHtr.I.F.YS CAsS-FUR'tHER QuALIFYING WoRDs.-The deed
in question conveyed certain premises to the plaintiff "for life, remainder in
fee simple to the heirs begotten of the body * * *·" The plaintiff brought suit
to quiet title against her son as defendant on the theory that she was entitled to
an estate in fee tail by operation of the Rule in Shelley's Case, and that this,
in tum, was converted into a fee simple by birth of issue. Notwithstanding a
statute which provided that ''the court shall carry into effect the expressed
intent of the parties," it was held, that the Rule in Shelley's Case is still in
force in Nebraska; but, that the plaintiff was entitled to a life estate only,
since the words, "heirs of the body", were not used in their technical sense,
the grantor having also provided that such heirs should take a fee simple.
Yates v. Yates (Neb., 1920), 178 N. W. 262.
The decision is one of many examples of the tenacious grip of this obsolete doctrine of the common law upon our present day jurisprudence. See,
Doyle v. Andis, 127 Iowa 36; 3 MICH. L. R:ev. 393. Nebraska still clings to
the rule which has now been abandoned by most of the states of this country.
Wilson v. Terry, 130 Mich. 73; Rich(Jrdson v. Wheatland, 7 Met. 16g. It is
curious to note that the court, in the principal case, attempts to justify the
operation of the Rule in Shelley's Case by its giving effect to the general
intent over and against the particular intent. Yates v. Yates, supra, at page
263; Fraser v. Chene, et"al, 2 Mich. 81, 91. The theory of general and particular intent has now been exploded. GRAY, THF. Rur.:e AGAINS'l' P.I!RPE'rUI'l'IF,S,
§§ 881-2; Doe v. Gallini, S B. & Ad. 621, 640. However, the court was undoubtedly correct in its decision that the technical force of the words, "of the
body'', was destroyed by the further direction that the estate in remainder was
to be a fee simple. Aidt v. Hillyard, 138 Iowa 239. It is worthy of note that
the court, in the principal case, might have arrived at the same decision by
construing the words of the instrument with reference to the intent of the
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grantor without determining the question, whether or not the Rule in Shelley's
Case is in force in Nebraska.
TRADSMARKS-RI<:GIS'.l'RATION.-Petitioner had applied for registration of a.
trademark containing a merely descriptive phrase, but consisting of nondescriptive and otherwise registerable matter in conjunction therewith. The
Commissioner refused to register the mark unless the descriptive phrases
were first erased therefrom. Held, the ruling was error and the mark should
have been registered as filed. Estate of P. D. Beckwith, Inc. v. The Commissioner of Patents (1920), 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 414The statute provides that no mark consisting "merely" of descriptive
words may be registered. Originally the practice of the Patent Office had
been to register marks which were otherwise proper, despite the fact that
they contained some descriptive words. In Johnson v. Brandau, 32 App. D. C.
348, the Commissione~ had held that "registration of a trademark is permitted
where the controlling and distinguishing feature of the mark is an arbitrary
symbol, although such symbol may be accompanied by accessories which in
themselves are not registerable." The appellate court, however, held the mark
not registerable until ~e applicant should disclaim and omit the words objected to. In Nairn Linoleum Works v. Ringwalt Linoleum Works, 46 App.
D. C. 64, application had been made for registration of a mark consisting of
·a registerable symbol accompanied by the descriptive words, "Ringwalt's Linoleum." The applicant, on requirement by the Commissioner, expressly disclaimed the descriptive words. The appellate court held that such disclaimer
was not sufficient; that it would lie hidden in the vaults of the Office, while
the mark would go out to the public as though the words and the symbol were
both protected; that the objectionable words must be not merely disclaimed
but musf be omitted from the mark. The principal case rejects this latter
proposition and holds that only marks consisting merely of descriptive words
can be refused registration. It restores the practice of registering otherwise
proper marks even though they contain unregisterable parts, at least, if the
unregisterable parts are disclaimed by the applicant. There is basis in the
opinion, however, for further decisions to limit this practice to cases where
the omission of the unregisterable parts would seriously affect the basic
character of the whole mark.

S!'tCIIIIC Pl;:R:FolQlAN~-RIGH'l' oit A QUASI AooPn:D Cnn.» ro Sm: FoR.When the plaintiff was at the age of six, his guardian and foster parents
entered into an oral contract whereby they agreed that they would legally
adopt the plaintiff and make him "heir to their property as a. son of their own
blood." However, adoption papers were never taken out. The plaintiff lived
with his foster parents for twenty-four years when his foster father died.
The heirs at law of the foster parents claim the estate. The plaintiff sues for
specific performance of the contract. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to
specific performance, and that part performance would enable equity to take
the contract out of the Statute of Frauds. Eva11s v. Kelly, et al, (Neb., 1920),
178 N. W. 630.
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Adoption is solely the creature of statutes, and hence, if the provisions of
the statute are not strictly complied with, the legal status of the child remains
unchanged. PtcK, DoMtsTic lttr.A'l'IONS, § lo6; Woodward's Appeal, 81 Conn.
152, 165. A mere oral contract to adopt will not, of itself, give the quasiadopted child the right to inherit from its foster parents. Grantham v.
Cossett, I82 Mo. 65I. However, the modern tendency seems to be that, where
there is a clear and unambiguous provision that the child shall inherit, equity
will give effect to the contract in favor of the foster child. Wright v. Wright,
99 Mich. I70; Chehak v. Battles, I33 Iowa I07. Such contracts are taken out
of the Statute of Frauds on the ground of the part performance on the part
of the child in rendering service to his foster parents. Wright v. Wright,
supra; Van Dyne v. Vreeland, I2 N. J.E. I42, I50. As to the rights generally
of legally adopted children, see, I8 MICH. L. ~v. 542.
fusPAss-CoN'l'INUING-LmI'l'ATION oF AC'!'IONS.-Plaintiffs owned a
tract of land fronting on a public street. More than six years before this
action was commenced, the county, in order to straighten the street, entered
anri took possession of a strip of the plaintiff's land, filled it in to make it
correspond to the grade of the highway, and turned it over to public use.
Defendant did not try to justify its act, but relied on the Statute of Limitations
as its only defense. Held, the instrucion of the court, that the statute was no
bar because the trespass was a continuous one, was correct. Morey v. Essez
County (N. J., 1920), no Atl. 905.
·
This decision is in line with the prevailing authority in holding that an
obstruction placed wrongfully upon another's land is a continuing trespass as
long as it remains there. Pappenhiem v. The Met. El. Ry. Co., 128 N. Y. 436;
Milton v. Puffer, 207 Mass. 4I6; Holmes v. Wilson, 37 E. C. L. 273. !It
throws no light, however, upon the untenable distinction, recognized by most
courts, between a hole and an obstruction. Kansas Pac. Ry. v. Mihlman-, 17
Kan. 224; Nat. Copper Co. v. Mint1;. Mining Co., 57 Mich. 83. See also the
note on "Continuous Trespass," I8 MICH. L. REv. 679. The Court does not
even intimate what its decision would have been had this been a ditch or a
hole instead of an obstruction.
TRIAL-S~ARING '!'Ht JuRY AFTI!:R 'l'Ht EvmsNct Is IN.-The defendant
was indicted for murder. On the trial the jurors were sworn on their voir
dire, and after twelve jurors were found to be qualified they were accepted
by both the defendant and the state. Immediately thereafter the evidence
was put in and both sid~s rested. Jt was then discovered and made known
for the first time that the jury had not been sworn to try the case. Over the
defendant's objection the jury was at once sworn to well and truly try the
case and a true verdict give, the arguments of counsel were made, and the
case was submitted fo the jury, who returned a verdict of .guilty. Error was
assigned on the ground that the defendant had been denied a jury trial because the jury was not under oath when the evidence was presented. Held,
(two judges dissenting), that the defendant had been denied a jury trial.
Miller v. State (Miss.,_ 1920), 84 So. 161.
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Only one other case passing upon this precise question has been found,
and strangely enough that was a case before the same court and was decided
exactly the other way, though it is not even mentioned in either the majority
or minority opinions in the principal case. Boroum v. State (1913), 105 Miss.
887. In that case it appeared that seven of the jurors had not been sworn to
try the case before the jury retired to consider their verdict, but the proper
oath was· administered before any conference or consultation was lield. The
court unanimously agreed that inasmuch as tlie verdict was considered and
arrived at after the jurors were sworn, the right of trial by jury was not "in
any way d'.emed, impaired· or diminished by the delay in swearing the jurors.''

